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Abstract
We investigate the effects of collaterals and monetary policy on growth
rate dynamics in a Ramsey economy where agents have heterogeneous
discount factors. We focus on the existence of business-cycle fluctuations
based on self-fulfilling prophecies and on the occurrence of deterministic
cycles through bifurcations. We introduce liquidity constraints in seg-
mented markets where impatient (poor) agents without collaterals have
limited access to credit. We find that an expansionary monetary pol-
icy may promote economic growth while making endogenous fluctuations
more likely. Conversely, a regulation reinforcing the role of collaterals and
reducing the financial market imperfections may enhance the economic
growth and stabilize the economy.
Key words: Collaterals, heterogeneous agents, balanced growth, en-
dogenous fluctuations, stabilization policies.
1 Introduction
The financial crisis of 2007-2008, known as subprime mortgage crisis, led at
the very end to tightening credit and slowing economic growth in the U.S. and
Europe. The drop in the value of collaterals, the titrization of bad credits and
the spread of toxic assets promoted a liquidity crisis together with financial and
real market instability. Two main ingredients are at the origin of such a global
crisis: a strong development of subprime loans distributed to households with
insufficient collaterals and new banking practices with respect to risk based
on insufficient banks’ own funds. The U.S. and European governments and
central banks have then decided to increase the collateral constraints to both
households and banks to avoid bad credits, and to increase the supply of money
to fight against the lack of liquidity. However, besides the problems related
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to sovereign debts, the effects of these policies on the growth rate have been
contrasted. While the U.S. seem to slightly recover its pre-2007 growth rate,
most European countries suffer from stagnation or even recession.
In this paper, we address the stability issue of growth rate dynamics consid-
ering the role of collaterals in a monetary economy with credit market imper-
fections. In the spirit of Barbar and Bosi (2010), we assume that agents pay a
part of their consumption purchases in cash, while the remainder is financed on
credit whose extent depends on the amount of collaterals. One of our goal is to
understand the role of collaterals in the occurrence of economic crises viewed as
self-fulfilling prophecies.
We consider a credit constraint, formulated as an extended cash-in-advance
constraint, which is similar in spirit to the credit constraint considered in Kiy-
otaki and Moore (1997). In our framework, consumers can borrow to consume
more than the cash they hold but they are constrained by the amount of col-
lateral they own. Similarly to Kiyotaki and Moore, we show that the credit
constraint crucially affects the existence of endogenous fluctuations. As ex-
plained below, depending on whether this constraint is binding for all agents
or only a part of them, we can get two different regimes, one with expectation-
driven fluctuations based on the existence of sunspot equilibria, and one without
transitional dynamics in which the equilibrium immediately jumps on the long
run balanced growth path (BGP). Although we do not consider a micro-founded
formulation based on monetary search models a` la Lagos and Wright (2005),
our results are also similar to the main conclusions of Ferraris and Watanabe
(2011).1 Embedding a model of credit a` la Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) into a
money search model a` la Lagos and Wright (2005), these authors show that
larger fluctuations arise when the credit constraint is binding and agents are at
their borrowing limit.2
In this paper, we consider an economy where agents have different discount
rates, cannot borrow against future labor income, but are allowed to pay a
part of current consumption on credit if collaterals are positive. We know that
heterogeneous discounting promotes the accumulation of capital in the hands of
the most patient agents (the capitalists). If individuals are allowed to borrow
against future income, the impatient agents borrow from the patient ones and
spend the rest of their life to work in order to refund the debt. In the spirit
of Becker (1980), Becker and Foias (1987, 1994), but in contrast to Le Van
and Vailakis (2003), we also introduce a borrowing constraint: we rule out the
possibility of negative capital (of debt). Through the credit constraint, a positive
capital works as collateral to reduce the amount of balances needed to finance
the current consumption. Thus markets are incomplete and collaterals weaken
the cash-in-advance.
We consider an endogenous growth model where technology contains a Romer-
type (1986) learning-by-doing externality leading to constant returns to scale
1See also Ferraris and Watanabe (2008).
2See also Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008) and Geanakoplos and Zame (2007) in which
the existence of collateralized assets affects market prices and allocations and can generate
fluctuations.
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in capital accumulation. Our aim is indeed to study the impact of borrow-
ing constraints and collaterals on the fluctuations of the growth rate. We will
then focus on the existence of business-cycle fluctuations based on self-fulfilling
prophecies and on the occurrence of deterministic cycles through bifurcations.
Under heterogeneous discounting, the population splits into two classes: pa-
tient capitalists and impatient workers.3 We prove that there is room for two
regimes: the one where the capitalist holds capital and no balances, the other
where money and capital enter her/his portfolio. In the first regime, the credit
constraint is not binding and the liquidity constraint does not affect patient
agents’ capital accumulation. The economy jumps on the balanced growth path.
This first conclusion is similar to the configuration with agents below their bor-
rowing limits considered by Ferraris and Watanabe (2011). In this case, they
show that fluctuations never occur in capital. In the second regime, the credit
constraint of patient agents binds and equilibrium transitions take place: en-
dogenous fluctuations (two-period cycles and indeterminacy) may arise around
the balanced growth path. This conclusion is now similar to the configura-
tion with agents at their borrowing limits considered by Ferraris and Watanabe
(2011) where fluctuations in capital occur. We also prove that an expansionary
monetary policy may be growth-enhancing and affects welfare but may at the
same time have a destabilizing effect.
More precisely, in the first regime (capitalists hold no money), money growth
improves the patient agents’ welfare, while worsening that of impatient agents,
who bear the opportunity cost of holding balances (nominal interest rate). It
affects the initial consumption, but has no effect on the growth rate. Focussing
on the welfare differential between the two classes of agents along the BGP, we
find an increase in social inequalities: the patient agents are richer because they
own the entire stock of capital and experience a higher welfare level through an
increase of consumption; the impatient ones are poorer and experience a welfare
deterioration.
In the second regime (capitalists hold money), money growth has a positive
impact on the growth rate but an ambiguous effect on initial consumptions and,
therefore, on agents’ welfare. This regime may be very different from the first
one: to highlight the possibility of the opposite effects, we provide sufficient
conditions on structural parameters and a numerical exercice with plausible
parameter values showing that money growth worsens the welfare of capitalists
(who now also bear the opportunity cost of holding balances) and improve the
welfare of workers. Mimicking the previous interpretations, we conclude that
an increase of the money growth rate may reduce the inequalities measured as
welfare differential between the agents along the BGP.
In addition, money growth promotes the occurrence of endogenous fluctua-
tions through self-fulfilling prophecies and crises. Indeed, it raises the inflation
rate and the nominal interest rate, that is the opportunity cost of holding money.
3Woodford (1986) also studies an economy with patient capitalists and impatient work-
ers financially constrained. Even if these agents are infinite-lived, his model looks like an
overlapping-generations model because of the form of the borrowing constraint. Our model is
closer to more traditional Ramsey models with cash-in-advance.
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The imperfection (liquidity constraint) has a larger impact on the consumption
smoothing of patient agents and makes indeterminacy more likely. Conversely,
the possibility of collateralization moderates the effect of the credit market im-
perfection and makes the endogenous fluctuations less likely. Then, we conclude
that, if the goal of the government is to avoid growth cycles, any increase of
money supply should be followed by an increase of the sensitivity of credit grants
to collaterals. In the light of the recent crisis, our results could be interpreted
as follows: since central banks increase the money supply through quantitative
easing policies, raising the weight of collaterals for all agents could also repre-
sent a mean to shelter the economy from the destabilizing effects of quantitative
easing.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sections 2 and 3, we present the model
and we derive the first-order conditions. In Section 4, we study the equilibrium
properties when capitalists hold no money. Section 5 considers the case where
they are also liquidity-constrained. Section 6 concludes. Mathematical details
are gathered in the Appendix.
2 Fundamentals
In this model, firms produce a single good, households work, consume and save
through capital and balances provided by a monetary authority. We specify the
fundamentals (technology, preferences, endowments) as follows.
2.1 Homogeneous firms
Firms are represented by a technology with private constant returns and increas-
ing social returns. There is a large number (J) of identical competitive firms.
The representative firm rents capital and labor to produce the good under con-
stant (private) returns to scale. External effects of capital intensity spill over
the other firms. Technology is rationalized by a Romer-type (1986) production
function that allows the existence of endogenous growth.
Assumption 1. The production function is given by F (Kj, Lj) ≡ Ak¯
1−sKsjL
1−s
j
with s ∈ (0, 1), and where Kj and Lj are the jth firm’s inputs and k¯ is the
average capital intensity in the economy.
In the following, we denote byK ≡
∑J
j=1Kj and L ≡
∑J
j=1 Lj the aggregate
capital and labor force, respectively. The TFP (Ak¯1−s) is affected by productive
externalities of average capital intensity k¯ ≡ K/L, such as knowledge spill-
overs. Since the firms share the same technology, we obtain at equilibrium
k = k¯ = Kj/Lj for every j. Each producer is price-taker and maximizes the
profit: Ak¯1−sKsjL
1−s
j − rKj − wLj . Under Assumption 1, profit maximization
requires productivities to be equal to factor prices:
rt = sA ≡ r (1)
wt = (1− s)Akt (2)
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where rt and wt are the real interest rate and the wage bill at period t. The
equilibrium interest rate is constant over time as in standard AK endogenous
growth models a` la Romer (1986).
2.2 Heterogenous households
There are n individuals in the economy who are differently endowed with capital.
Each individual has indeed an initial endowment of capital ki0 ≥ 0. His/her
utility function has a constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution σ.
Assumption 2. The utility function is given by u (ci) ≡ c
1−1/σ
i / (1− 1/σ) for
σ 6= 1, with σ > 0, and u (ci) ≡ ln ci for σ = 1.
Individuals are also characterized by different time preferences. Without loss
of generality, we consider from now on two types of heterogeneous infinite-lived
agents: i = 0, 1, with heterogeneous discount factors βi. We call 0 the patient
type and 1 the impatient one.
Assumption 3.1. β1 < β0.
There are ni individuals of type i with n0 + n1 = n. Each consumer i
maximizes the following intertemporal additive utility function
∞∑
t=0
βtiu (cit) (3)
with respect to a sequence (kit+1, cit)
∞
t=0 under a sequence of budget constraints:
Mit+1 −Mit + pt (kit+1 −∆kit) + ptcit ≤ ptrtkit + ptwtlit + ptτit (4)
and borrowing constraints
ptcit − γptkit ≤Mit (5)
with kit ≥ 0 and δ = 1−∆ ∈ (0, 1), the depreciation rate of capital. Consump-
tion (ci) and capital (ki) are the same good: they are produced with the same
technology and have the same price (p).
The RHS of constraint (4) is the monetary income at the individual disposal.
In real terms, it is the sum of capital income (rtkit), labor income (wtlit) and
transfers from the monetary authority (τit). This disposable income is partly
saved in form of money (Mit+1 −Mit) and capital (kit+1 − ∆kit), and partly
consumed. In addition, the representative household faces the partial cash-
in-advance constraint (5): in the spirit of Grandmont and Youne`s (1972), we
assume that a share of purchases is paid cash, while the rest on credit. We are
also close to Lucas and Stokey (1987) with a cash and a credit good.
The individual’s wealth matters in order to pay current consumption on
credit. We consider indeed a cash-in-advance constraint which is extended to
introduce a credit constraint in the spirit of the constraint considered by Kiy-
otaki and Moore (1997). The amount of credit depends on household’s collat-
erals. We assume for simplicity that the credit grant is proportional to nominal
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collaterals (γptkit). γ represents either the common credit sensitivity to col-
laterals or the market rules. More precisely, γ captures the lenders’ or sellers’
prudential attitude towards borrowers in presence of asymmetric informations,
but also credit market regulation policies, that is a legal constraints to credit
grants in order to ensure borrowers’ solvability. To buy a constant amount of
consumption on credit d = γkit, the required amount of collateral is given by
kit = d/γ: so, the higher the parameter γ, the lower the needs of collateral
to buy the amount d on credit. If γ is sufficiently high, the cash-in-advance
is no longer binding and the capitalist no longer needs balances to finance the
consumption purchases. Put differently, increasing γ can then be interpreted as
a policy generating higher consumption based on a larger agents’ solvability.
Note also that the introduction of collaterals in a model of capital accumu-
lation implies that the velocity of money with respect to consumption becomes
endogenous. Our formulation then takes into account one of the criticisms ad-
dressed to the cash-in-advance models: the implausibility of a constant velocity
of money.4
In order to simplify the model, we finally assume that patient agents supply
no labor, while impatient agents supply one unit of labor.
Assumption 4. l0t = 0 and l1t = 1.
It is worth noting that Assumption 4 is not restrictive. Indeed, similar models
with endogenous labor supply may easily exhibit a steady state where patient
agents supply no labor (see Bosi and Seegmuller (2010)). Since our main results
are robust to the consideration of endogenous labor, we will focus on the case
with inelastic labor for purpose of tractability.
2.3 Monetary authority
Let Mt denotes the aggregate supply of money at time t. Each period, an
amount Mt+1 −Mt of money is ”helicoptered” to agents. More precisely, an
exogenous share θi is given to agents of type i. For simplicity, we assume also
the same shares as initial conditions: niMi0 = θiM0 for i = 0, 1. In addition,
money supply grows at a constant factor η ≡ Mt+1/Mt. The monetary policy
consists in a pair of instruments (η, θ0) because the other share is determined:
θ1 = 1 − θ0. Normally, real economies experience nonnegative money growth
rates.
Assumption 5. η ≥ 1.
4Money-In-the-Utility (MIU) models are immunized against this criticism: the functional
equivalence highlighted by Feenstra (1986) between CIA and MIU, no longer holds with a
Cash-When-I’m-Done (CWID) timing or a CIA timing and strictly positive elasticity of sub-
stitution between consumption and real balances (see Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2003).
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3 First-order conditions
The individual i maximizes the intertemporal utility (3) under the constraints
(4) and (5). Under Assumption 2, her/his demand for money and for goods
rests on the first-order conditions:
βtic
−1/σ
it = pt (λit + µit) (6)
ptλit ≥ pt+1 [λit+1 (rt+1 +∆) + γµit+1] (7)
λit ≥ λit+1 + µit+1 (8)
where λit and µit are the nonnegative multipliers associated to constraints (4)
and (5) respectively.
Let πt+1 ≡ pt+1/pt denote the inflation factor. Equation (7) and (8) hold
with equality if kit+1 > 0 and Mt+1 > 0 respectively. The additional Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker conditions hold:
ptλit (rtkit + wt + τit − πt+1mit+1 +mit − kit+1 +∆kit − cit) = 0
ptµit (mit − cit + γkit) = 0
where mit = Mit/pt is the individual demand for real balances. If µit > 0, the
cash-in-advance constraint is binding, while, if µit = 0, the constraint becomes
superfluous. In such a case, under the standard assumption of positive nominal
interest rate, the agent holds no money because of the opportunity cost of money
holding (Mit = 0).
5
The initial and the final conditions are given by the initial endowments:
Mi0, ki0 ≥ 0 and the transversality conditions:
lim
t→+∞
βtic
−1/σ
it (kit+1 + πt+1mit+1) = 0 (9)
for each individual i = 0, 1.
In the following, we consider two regimes.
(1) The patient agent’s liquidity constraint is always nonbinding.
(2) The patient agent’s liquidity constraint is always binding.
For the sake of simplicity, we do not consider the case in which the equilibrium
switches from a regime to another.
4 Patient agents buy on credit
When the patient agent is sufficiently wealthy, s/he does not need money: s/he
holds enough collaterals to buy on credit (the liquidity constraint (5) is inef-
fective). In this section, we study the regime where money is demanded only
by impatient agents and we characterize the equilibrium in the long run. The
economy will appear to move along the balanced growth path without transition.
5Indeed, when µit+1 = 0, the inequality (7) becomes λit ≥ λit+1pit+1 (∆ + rt+1). Then,
if, at the same time, Mit+1 > 0 , we get λit = λit+1 and 1 ≥ pit+1 (∆ + rt+1) which implies
a negative nominal interest rate.
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4.1 Patient agent
In the first regime, the patient agent’s liquidity constraint becomes superfluous.
Thus, in the case of positive interest rate, s/he holds no money (M0t = 0) and
c0t < γk0t. From (1) and first-order conditions (6)-(8) with µ0t = 0, we derive
the Euler inequality (
c0t+1
c0t
)1/σ
≥ β0 (∆ + sA)
which holds with equality if k0t > 0, and the budget constraint:
k0t+1 −∆k0t + c0t = sAk0t + τ0t (10)
The transversality condition simplifies to:
lim
t→+∞
βtc
−1/σ
0t k0t+1 = 0 (11)
4.2 Impatient agent
Focus now on the impatient agent who needs money to finance future con-
sumption. From (1) and first-order conditions (6)-(8) with µit > 0 and λit =
λit+1+µit+1 (the liquidity constraint is binding), we derive the Euler inequality:(
c1t+1
c1t
)1/σ
≥ β1
pit
pit+1
∆+sA−γ
1−γpit
which holds with equality if k1t+1 > 0, and the constraints:
m1t+1πt+1 −m1t + k1t+1 −∆k1t + c1t = sAk1t + wt + τ1t (12)
c1t − γk1t = m1t (13)
The transversality condition (9) holds.
4.3 Balanced growth path
As usual in endogenous growth models with AK technology, the long-run equi-
librium is characterized by a stationary growth rate. On this basis, a Balanced
Growth Path (BGP) is a sequence where the real variables grow at the same
rate, namely kit+1 = g
∗kit and cit+1 = g
∗cit, where g
∗ is the stationary balanced
growth factor and g∗ − 1 the corresponding rate.
Within standard exogenous growth models with infinitely lived agents, the
heterogenous discounting implies the Ramsey conjecture (1928) later proved by
Becker (1981): impatient agents hold no capital in the long run. We can show
now that this property also holds in our model along a BGP.
Focus first on the money market. Demand for balances depend on the cash-
in-advance constraint. On the supply side, each agent of type i receives in
period t an amount θi (Mt+1 −Mt) /ni of nominal balances from the monetary
authority:
Mt+1 −Mt = θ0 (Mt+1 −Mt) + θ1 (Mt+1 −Mt) = n0ptτ0t + n1ptτ1t (14)
where
τit = (mt+1πt+1 −mt) θi/ni (15)
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Money market clears. The equality between the aggregate supply and demand
writes:
mt = n1m1t (16)
As usual, in dynamic monetary models, money growth has both inflationary
and real effects (growth of real balances):
η = πt+1mt+1/mt (17)
Replacing (16) in (17) gives:
πt+1 = ηm1t/m1t+1 (18)
Along the BGP, the inflation factor π = η/g∗ is constant and the decomposition
η = g∗π holds. Aggregating side by side the budget constraints (4) now binding
across individuals, we obtain
n0 (k0t+1 −∆k0t + c0t) + n1 (m1t+1πt+1 −m1t + c1t)
= n0 (rtk0t + τ0t) + n1 (wt + τ1t)
Replacing (16) in the LHS and (14) in the RHS, we obtain
n0 (k0t+1 −∆k0t) + n0c0t + n1c1t = n0rtk0t + n1wt
Replacing the firms’ equilibrium prices (1) and (4.2), and noticing that kt ≡
Kt/Lt = n0k0t/n1, that is n0k0t = n1kt, we have the good market clearing:
n1 (kt+1 −∆kt) + n0c0t + n1c1t = n1Akt (19)
that is, the aggregate investment plus the aggregate consumption is equal to
the aggregate production.
Usually, the heterogeneity of discounting (β1 < β0) implies that patient
agents hold the entire stock of capital in the long run. In our monetary economy
where patient agents do not hold money, β1 < β0 (Assumption 3.1) no longer
ensures this degenerate distribution of capital. Assumption 3.1 has indeed to
be replaced by a more restrictive assumption.
Assumption 3.2. β0
β1
> (∆+sA−γ)[β0(∆+sA)]
σ
(∆+sA)([β0(∆+sA)]
σ−γη)
Obviously, when γ = 0, Assumption 3.2 reduces to Assumption 3.1. As we
have shown that along a BGP, the inflation factor π is constant and given by
η/g∗ = π, Assumption 3.2 is actually equivalent to
β0 (∆ + sA) > β1
∆+sA−γ
1−γpi
Let us then explain why Assumption 3.1 no longer implies a degenerate distri-
bution of capital. In a monetary economy, the nominal interest rate has to be
positive: π (∆ + sA) > 1 (Fisher decomposition and zero lower bound). This
inequality is equivalent to
(∆+sA−γ)[β0(∆+sA)]
σ
(∆+sA)([β0(∆+sA)]
σ−γη) > 1
If β1 < β0 is chosen too close to β0, we have also
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(∆+sA−γ)[β0(∆+sA)]
σ
(∆+sA)([β0(∆+sA)]
σ−γη) >
β0
β1
or, equivalently,
β0 (∆ + sA) < β1
∆+sA−γ
1−γpi
However, along a BGP,
c0t+1
c0t
= c1t+1c1t = g
∗
and, because of inequalities (4.1) and (4.2),
β0 (∆ + sA) < g
∗1/σ = β1
∆+sA−γ
1−γpi
In this case, patient agents hold no capital. Since they hold no money (first
regime) and do not work (Assumption 4), they have no mean to consume, that
is a contradiction.
Conversely, under Assumption 3.2, patient agents hold capital while the
impatient ones do not:
c0t+1
c0t
= c1t+1c1t = g
∗ = [β0 (∆ + sA)]
σ >
(
β1
∆+sA−γ
1−γpi
)σ
The impatient agent indeed wants to consume more today (c1t) instead of
tomorrow (c1t+1) in order to lower the term c1t+1/c1t in the LHS of inequality
and restore the equality. To this purpose, s/he dissaves over time. In order to
finance the current consumption at any period, s/he ends up to hold no capital.
The assumption of borrowing constraints requires kit ≥ 0 (Becker, 1981). Thus,
in the long run k1t = 0 for every t (even during transition). In the long run,
only the patient agents hold capital.
The positivity of interest rate and the nonnegativity of the growth rate along
the BGP means respectively:
π (∆ + sA) = η(∆+sA)[β0(∆+sA)]σ > 1 and g
∗ = [β0 (∆ + sA)]
σ
≥ 1
or, equivalently, 1/ (∆ + sA) ≤ β0 < η
1/σ (∆ + sA)
1/σ−1
. Under Assumption
5, a more restrictive condition is 1/ (∆ + sA) ≤ β0 < (∆ + sA)
1/σ−1
. Clearly,
the left inequality makes sense only if ∆ + sA > 1.
Assumption 6. ∆+ sA > 1 and 1/ (∆ + sA) ≤ β0 < (∆ + sA)
1/σ−1
.
Around a BGP, equations (12) and (13) become
m1t+1πt+1 −m1t + c1t = wt + τ1t (20)
c1t = m1t (21)
and the transversality condition (9) simplifies:
lim
t→+∞
βt1c
−1/σ
1t πt+1m1t+1 = 0 (22)
To simplify the analysis, let us set
(gt+1, x0t, x1t) ≡
(
kt+1
kt
, m0tkt ,
m1t
kt
)
In the following proposition, we prove that, as in the initial Romer (1986)
model, the BGP is the only possible equilibrium and there is no room for tran-
sitional dynamics.
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Proposition 1. Let Assumptions 1, 2, 3.2, 4, 5 and 6 hold. Any equilibrium
where patient agents only hold capital and impatient agents only hold money is
a BGP with gt = g
∗ ≡ [β0 (∆ + sA)]
σ ≥ 1 and
(x0t, x1t) =
(
0, (1−s)A1+(η−1)θ0
)
c00 = k0
n1
n0
[
∆+ sA+ (1−s)A(η−1)θ01+(η−1)θ0 − g
∗
]
> 0
c10 =
(1−s)Ak0
1+(η−1)θ0
> 0
(23)
Proof. See Appendix 7.1.
Since capitalists do not hold money, the parameter γ does not have any
impact on the growth rate g∗ and the initial consumptions ci0. The fact that
the BGP is the only equilibrium means that, under rational expectations, the
forward-looking variable (consumption) adjusts to ensure that the economy
jumps from the very beginning on the BGP, and there is no transition. This
conclusion is similar to one of the main results of Ferraris and Watanabe (2011).
They show indeed that when agents are below their borrowing limits, fluctua-
tions never occur in capital.
Recall that the regime we consider is c0t/k0t < γ with k0t = kt since patient
agents hold no money and impatient agents hold no capital. Using Proposition
1, we find that this inequality is equivalent to
γ > (∆ + sA)
[
1− βσ0 (∆ + sA)
σ−1
]
+ (1−s)A(η−1)θ01+(η−1)θ0 > 0
This inequality gives a lower bounds for the sensitivity to collaterals. Indeed, if
γ is lower, the capitalists have not enough collaterals to pay all the consumption
on credit and they partially needs balances, while if γ satisfies (4.3), they can
pay all the consumption on credit.
4.4 Monetary policy
Along the BGP, the monetary policy does not affect the growth factor g∗ but
it has an impact on the consumption and the welfare of both types of agents.
The impact on cit = g
∗tci0 and
Ui ≡
∞∑
t=0
βtiu (cit) =
∞∑
t=0
βti
(ci0g
∗t)
1−1/σ
1− 1/σ
=
σ
σ − 1
c
1−1/σ
i0
1− βig∗1−1/σ
(24)
is qualitatively the same because, under the transversality condition βig
∗1−1/σ <
1, ∂Ui/∂ci0 > 0. However, the impact on the initial consumption of each agent
is different as it is shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3.2, 4, 5 and 6, along the BGP, we
have
∂U0
∂η > 0 and
∂U1
∂η < 0
and, if η > 1,
∂U0
∂θ0
> 0 and ∂U1∂θ0 < 0
Proof. See Appendix 7.2.
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The impact of the money growth factor η can be interpreted as follows:
the patient agent receives more money today and bears no opportunity cost of
holding money, because s/he spends these balances today (s/he does need money
to finance consumption tomorrow). The impatient agents bears an opportunity
cost in order to finance future consumption with money. This opportunity cost is
given by the nominal interest rate and increases with the monetary growth rate
because of the inflation. Her/his cost is greater than the benefit of additional
monetary transfers to impatient agents from the monetary authority. Since
patient agents are richer than impatient ones as they own the whole stock of
capital, we can interpret social inequalities as a difference between the utility
levels along the BGP of the two classes of agents. We show here that inequalities
increase with η and that the impact of the share θ0 of money ”helicoptered” to
patient agents is similar.
5 Patient agents pay cash
Consider now the second regime where the patient agent’s liquidity constraint
is also always binding. The household is aware of the credit function, which is
a sort of institutional constraint (endogenous structure of the credit market or
legal constraints). Both types of agents have a binding cash-in-advance so that
both hold money.
5.1 Patient agent
Patient agent’s consumption smoothing over time is affected by the liquidity con-
straint. The Euler equation captures the intertemporal arbitrage and includes
now the monetary effects through the inflation rate. Indeed, the capitalist also
bears the opportunity cost of money holding. In order to understand the effects
of inflation on the nominal interest rate and this opportunity cost, we com-
pute the patient agent’s Euler equation. From (1) and the first-order conditions
(6)-(8) with µ0t > 0, we derive the Euler inequality:(
c0t+1
c0t
)1/σ
≥ β0
pit
pit+1
∆+sA−γ
1−γpit
which holds with equality if k0t > 0, and the constraints:
m0t+1πt+1 −m0t + k0t+1 −∆k0t + c0t = rtk0t + τ0t (25)
c0t − γk0t = m0t (26)
Comparing (5.1) with (4.1), we observe that now inflation matters. Since
patient agent’s wealth accumulation coincides with the aggregate capital accu-
mulation, inflation has a direct effect on economic growth.
5.2 Impatient agent
As in the first regime, equations (4.2), (12), (13) and the transversality condition
(9) still apply.
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5.3 Intertemporal equilibrium and balanced growth path
Equations (14) and (15) still hold. However, now the capitalists hold money
and the market clearing becomes:
mt = n0m0t + n1m1t (27)
Replacing (27) in (17) gives the inflation dynamics:
πt+1 = η
mt
mt+1
= η n0m0t+n1m1tn0m0t+1+n1m1t+1
Equation (19) (good market clearing) still holds.
Under Assumption 3.1, considering simultaneously equations (4.2) and (5.1),
we immediately conclude that now there will be some transitional dynamics and
that along the transition equation (5.1) must be satisfied with equality while
equation (4.2) must be satisfied with a strict inequality. Put differently, we
conclude as in the first regime that the Ramsey conjecture still holds. Impatient
agents hold no capital and their consumption depends only on money holding,
i.e. equations (20) and (21) hold.
Consider again the ratios (4.3). We may then compute the dynamical system
that drives the transitional dynamics.
Proposition 3. Let Assumptions 1, 2, 3.1, 4 and 5 hold. Then, when the pa-
tient agent cash-in-advance constraint is binding, the intertemporal equilibrium
satisfies the following system
ηn1x1t+1 + (1− η) θ1 (n0x0t+1 + n1x1t+1) = n1 (1− s)A
n0x0t+1+n1x1t+1
n0x0t+n1x1t
gt
gt+1
ηn1x1t+(1−η)θ1(n0x0t+n1x1t)
ηn1x1t+1+(1−η)θ1(n0x0t+1+n1x1t+1)
[
1− γ ηgt
n1(1−s)A
ηn1x1t+(1−η)θ1(n0x0t+n1x1t)
]
= β0 (sA+∆− γ)
(
n0x0t + γn1
n0x0t+1 + γn1
1
gt+1
)1/σ
(28)
where gt is given by
gt = g (x0t, x1t) ≡ ∆+ sA− γ − (1− s)A
ηn0x0t+(1−η)θ0(n0x0t+n1x1t)
ηn1x1t+(1−η)θ1(n0x0t+n1x1t)
Proof. See Appendix 7.3.
Equations (28) and (28) form a two-dimensional system in (x0t, x1t). As we
will show, the steady state of this system is a balanced growth factor which rep-
resents a BGP. This system then describes not only the long run (the BGP) but
also the short run (transition to or around the BGP) that can be characterized
by endogenous fluctuations.6
Along the BGP, the Euler equations (4.2), (5.1) and Assumption 3.1 imply
c0t+1
c0t
= c1t+1c1t = g
∗ =
(
β0
∆+sA−γ
1−γpi
)σ
>
(
β1
∆+sA−γ
1−γpi
)σ
6See also Boucekkine et al. (2005) for the existence of oscillatory dynamics in an AK model
with vintage capital, or Boucekkine and Ruiz-Tamarit (2008) for the analysis of transitional
dynamics in the Uzawa-Lucas model.
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with π = η/g∗. We provide simple conditions for the existence and uniqueness
of g∗ along which all the variables (balances, capital and consumption) grow
at a constant rate. To simplify the characterization, we introduce the following
additional assumptions that provide sufficient conditions for the existence of
endogenous growth, i.e. the existence of a balanced growth factor larger than
1.
Assumption 7.1. ∆+ sA− γ > 1.
Assumption 8. ηγ + β0 (∆ + sA− γ) ≥ 1.
Assumption 9. γ < (∆ + sA− γ)
[
1− β0 (∆ + sA− γ)
1−1/σ
]
.
We then derive the following result.
Proposition 4. Let Assumptions 1, 2, 3.1, 4, 5, 7.1, 8 and 9 hold. There
exists η¯ > 1 such that when η ∈ [1, η¯), there is a unique BGP g∗ ≥ 1 which is
solution of
g = γη + β0 (∆ + sA− γ) g
σ−1
σ ≡ ϕ (g) (29)
and which satisfies kt = k0g
∗t, c0t = c00g
∗t and c1t = c10g
∗t with
x0 =
[1 + (η − 1) θ0] (∆ + sA− γ − g
∗) + (1− s)A(η − 1)θ0
η
n1
n0
> 0 (30)
x1 =
(1− s)A [1 + (η − 1) θ1] + θ1 (η − 1) (∆ + sA− γ − g
∗)
η
> 0 (31)
c00 = k0
(
n1
n0
γ + x0
)
> 0 (32)
c10 = k0x1 > 0 (33)
Proof. See Appendix 7.4.
It is important to note here that the constraint c0t/k0t > γ always hold
along the BGP. Indeed, we derive from equations (30) and (32) in Proposition
4 that c0t/k0t = n0c00/ (n1k0) which is larger than γ.
5.4 Monetary policy
One may wonder whether either a monetary expansion or a financial markets
regulation can have a positive impact on economic growth and citizens’ welfare.
5.4.1 Effects on growth
First, let us focus on the effects on the growth rate. We know that the monetary
growth factor is the product of the inflation and the growth factor (see (5.3)).
However, monetary policy affects the extent of inflation and growth in turn. For
simplicity, we consider the policy issue along the BGP.
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Proposition 5. Let Assumptions 1, 2, 3.1, 4, 5, 7.1, 8 and 9 hold. The impact
of monetary growth is positive:
∂g∗
∂η =
σγ
1−γpi(1−σ) > 0
with η = πg∗. The impact of sensitivity to collaterals is also positive:
∂g∗
∂γ =
σg∗
1−γpi(1−σ)
pi(∆+sA)−1
∆+sA−γ > 0
Proof. See Appendix 7.5.
Focus first on (5). Issuing money increases the inflation and the nominal
interest rate. The opportunity cost of holding money increases and agents hold
less money, consume less and accumulate more capital. In our model, money
growth is growth-enhancing.
Let us now interpret (5). Under a higher γ, increasing capital lowers more
money demand and the opportunity cost of holding money (which is positive
because we assume a positive nominal interest rate). Then households want to
hold more capital and this enhances growth.
5.4.2 Effects on welfare
The growth rate does not capture the welfare of society: because there is a
trade off between the initial consumption and the growth rate (consuming less
at the beginning promotes higher saving and investment) and because agents
are heterogenous. Consider again the expression (24) where c00 and c10 are
given by (32) and (33). We study both the effects of η and of γ.
Proposition 6. Let Assumptions 1, 2, 3.1, 4, 5, 7.1, 8 and 9 hold. The impact
of η (monetary growth) and γ (credit sensitivity to collaterals) on the welfare Ui
of a social class (patient capitalists or impatient workers) is ambiguous. This
impact can be disentangled in a positive effect on the growth rate and an am-
biguous effect on the initial consumption c0i. However, we get the following
clear-cut conclusions:
i) There exist γ¯ > 0 and θ¯0 ∈ (0, 1) such that when γ ∈ (0, γ¯) and θ0 ∈(
0, θ¯0
)
, then ∂U0/∂η < 0 and ∂U1/∂η > 0.
ii) There exist γ˜ > 0 and θ˜1 ∈ (0, 1) such that when γ ∈ (0, γ˜) and θ1 ∈
(0, θ˜1), then ∂U0/∂γ > 0 and ∂U1/∂γ > 0.
Proof. See Appendix 7.6.
The positive effect on the growth rate has been highlighted in Proposition 5.
The ambiguous effects on consumptions entail at the very end a global ambiguity
for welfare which can however be clarified under some parameters’ restrictions.
It is worthwhile noting that, contrary to the first regime, money growth may
now worsen the welfare of capitalists, who now also bear the opportunity cost
of holding balances, and improve the welfare of workers. As patient agents are
richer than impatient ones because they own the total stock of capital, this
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decrease in the utility differential along the BGP between the two groups can
be interpreted as a reduction of social inequalities. However, the welfare of
both agents is positively impacted by the credit sensitivity to collaterals. The
plausibility of these effects is supported by a calibrated example in Section 4.7
where an interpretation is also provided.
5.5 Sunspot fluctuations and stabilization policy
Agents care about their own welfare and a benevolent monetary authority takes
into account individual preferences to implement a citizens-oriented monetary
policy. However individuals are risk averse and dislike in general inefficient
fluctuations. In particular, they dislike expectation-driven fluctuations that
may occur when multiple equilibria (indeterminacy and sunspots) arise from
market imperfections. In this respect, there is a second scope for monetary
policy and regulation: the stabilization issue.
Local indeterminacy occurs when the number of eigenvalues inside the unit
circle exceeds the number of predetermined variables. Since there are no pre-
determined variables in our dynamical system (??)-(28), local indeterminacy
occurs if at least one eigenvalue is inside the unit circle. In the case of a two-
dimensional system, in the spirit of Grandmont et al. (1998), we do not need
to study the eigenvalues but simply the trace and determinant (T,D) of the
Jacobian matrix evaluated at the steady state. Let us draw in a space (T,D),
the lines corresponding to D = 1, D = T − 1, D = −T − 1.
A1 A1
A2
✻
✲
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
T
D
Figure 1: Areas of local indeterminacy.
Local indeterminacy then arises when the pair (T,D) lies inside the areas A1
with one eigenvalue within the unit circle, or A2 with two eigenvalues within
the unit circle.
Let us introduce the reduced variables:
(y0, z0, a0) ≡
(
n0x0
n0x0+γn1
, n0x0n0x0+n1x1 ,
(1−η)θ1z0
η(1−z0)+(1−η)θ1
)
and the elasticities of the growth rate g (x0, x1) as given by (3):
(ε0, ε1) ≡
(
∂g
∂x0
x0
g ,
∂g
∂x1
x1
g
)
To simplify notations, let us denote
h = 1/ (1− γπ) > 1 (34)
with η = πg∗.
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Lemma 7. Let Assumptions 1, 2, 3.1, 4, 5, 7.1, 8 and 9 hold. The linearization
of the two-dimensional system (??)-(28) around the steady state (30)-(31) yields
the Jacobian matrix:
J =


σ(1−a0−ε0)+ε0
(z0−a0)(σ−y0)
σ
σ−y0
y0+ε0−σ(a0+ε0)
(z0−a0)(σ−y0)
σ
σ−y0


[
z0 1− z0
h (a0 + ε0)−
y0
σ h (1− a0 − ε0)
]
(35)
Proof. See Appendix 6.7.
The determinant and the trace of this Jacobian matrix are, respectively:
D = y0(1−z0)+hσ(z0−a0−ε0)(σ−y0)(z0−a0) and T = 1 +D +
1+(h−1)σ
(σ−y0)(z0−a0)
ε0
To apply the geometrical method developed by Grandmont et al. (1998), we
choose the elasticity of intertemporal substitution σ as the bifurcation parame-
ter. It does not enter directly the variables (x0, y0, z0, a0, x1, h) appearing in the
Jacobian (35) (see the expressions (30), (31), (5.5), (34)), but only indirectly
through g∗. Thus, the crucial question becomes whether we can keep g∗ as fixed
while moving σ. If we can normalize g∗ such that moving σ no longer affects
g∗, then the Jacobian matrix will depend only directly on σ and no longer in-
directly through g∗. Focussing on the equation of steady state (29), we observe
that the only possible way to normalize g∗ is to scale another parameters which
affects only g∗ with no impact on the other variables (x0, y0, z0, a0, x1, h) in the
Jacobian. It is easy to verify that there is only one candidate to play with: β0.
Indeed, β0 does not appear directly in expressions (30), (31), (5.5), (34). In
addition, we can set β0 to normalize the endogenous growth factor g
∗ to one.
Such particular normalization simplifies the checking of all the restrictions that
ensure the existence of a BGP. Of course, this simplification implies that we
focus on a configuration without growth. However, all our results are also com-
patible with a positive growth in the long run since they will hold by continuity
for any g∗ ∈ [1, 1 + ǫ) with ǫ > 0.
Setting g∗ = 1 and solving equation (29), we find
β∗0 ≡
1−γη
∆+sA−γ
that is a positive discount factor under Assumption 4, which is also less than
1 under Assumption 7.1. Of course, when g∗ is slightly larger than 1 with
g∗ ∈ (1, 1 + ǫ), the associated value of β∗0 remains close to expression (5.5).
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Consider then the line Σ ≡ {(T (σ) , D (σ)) : σ > 0 given (h, ε0, a0, y0, z0)}
in the (T,D)-plane. Let S = D′ (σ) /T ′ (σ) be the slope of Σ and (T0, D0) ≡
(T (0) , D (0)) and (T∞, D∞) ≡ limσ→+∞ (T (σ) , D (σ)) be its limit values. The
following lemmas characterize the behavior of alternative economies obtained
by varying the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
First, as there exists a unique BGP, we can derive a useful property.
7The corresponding value of discounting is β∗0 =
g∗−γη
∆+sA−γ
g∗
1−σ
σ .
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Lemma 8. Let Assumptions 1, 2, 3.1, 4, 5, 7.1, 8 and 9 hold, and η ∈ [1, η¯)
with η¯ as given by Proposition 4. For any σ ≥ 0, T 6= 1+D so that no eigenvalue
is equal to 1. Moreover, there exist ǫ > 0 and β∗0 (ǫ) ∈ (0, 1) such that for any
g∗ ∈ [1, 1 + ǫ) and β0 = β
∗
0 (ǫ), there is a σ¯ > 0 such that D = ±∞ and T = ±∞
when σ = σ¯.
Proof. See Appendix 7.8.
Second, to characterize the location of the line Σ, we introduce an inequality
alternative to Assumption 7.1 which is mildly stronger.
Assumption 7.2. ∆+ sA− γ > 1 + (1− s)A.
Note that this inequality can be also formulated as ∆+ (2s− 1)A− γ > 1. For
a given γ, it will be satisfied if s > 1/2 and A is large enough.
Lemma 9. Let Assumptions 1, 2, 3.1, 4, 5, 7.2, 8 and 9 hold, and η ∈ [1, η¯)
with η¯ as given by Proposition 4. There exist ǫ > 0 and β∗0 (ǫ) ∈ (0, 1) such
that for any g∗ ∈ [1, 1 + ǫ) and β0 = β
∗
0 (ǫ), −1 < D0 < min {0, T0 − 1}, D∞ >
max {1, T∞ − 1} and T∞ > 2. Moreover, D
′ (σ) < 0, S ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (1,+∞).
Proof. See Appendix 7.9.
Let us introduce the bifurcation value:
σ∗ ≡ 11+h
1+2y0
(
1−z0
ε0
+
a0−z0
ε0
)
1+2
a0−z0
ε0
= 1−γη2−γη
1+2y0
(
1−z0
x1
+
1−z0
ε0
)
1+2
1−z0
x1
since π = η when g∗ = 1. Assumption 7.2 implies D0 > −1 but is not crucial for
the occurrence of indeterminacy. However, it is sufficient to ensure the existence
of a positive value for σ∗ generating an intersection between the Σ line and the
locus corresponding to D+ T +1 = 0. Applying Lemmas 7, 8 and 9, we obtain
the following geometrical configurations depending on the value of the slope S.
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 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
T
D
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁σ∗
(T0, D0)
(T∞, D∞)
Σ
Figure 2: Local indeterminacy with S > 1.
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Figure 3: Local indeterminacy with S ∈ (−1, 0).
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Figure 4: Local indeterminacy with S < −1.
We then derive the main proposition.
Proposition 10. Let Assumptions 1, 2, 3.1, 4, 5, 7.2, 8 and 9 hold, and
η ∈ [1, η¯) with η¯ as given by Proposition 4. There exist ǫ > 0 and β∗0 (ǫ) ∈ (0, 1)
such that for any g∗ ∈ [1, 1 + ǫ) and β0 = β
∗
0 (ǫ), the steady state is a saddle
point for σ ∈ (0, σ∗) (equilibrium indeterminacy) and a source for σ > σ∗
(determinacy). Moreover, at σ = σ∗, the system generically undergoes a flip
bifurcation and two-period cycles arise.
Proof. Simply observe that σ∗ solves D (σ) = −T (σ) − 1 and apply Lemmas
7, 8 and 9 together with Figures 2, 3 and 4. Note that generically, when S < 0,
S 6= −1.
The very interpretation of this proposition rests on the comparison between
Ramsey models with or without cash-in-advance. In our model, capital accumu-
lation is driven by the Euler equation of the patient agent. When the patient
agent is constrained, our model behaves as a cash-in-advance Ramsey model
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with representative agent (see Stockman (1981), Svensson (1985) and Cooley
and Hansen (1989)). In this case, cycles and indeterminacy may arise.
The intuition for two-period cycles and indeterminacy in the Ramsey mod-
els a` la Stockman (1981) is simple. Consider the limit case γ = n1 = 0 (the
patient agent becomes the representative agent and collaterals no longer mat-
ter). The intuition for cycles is the following. Assume that kt increases from its
steady-state value. Then, the income Akt increases as well. If the intertemporal
substitution σ is weak, the income effect prevails and raises current consump-
tion ct. If the intertemporal substitution is sufficiently weak, the response in
terms of ct exceeds the increase of (∆ +A) kt and, according to the budget con-
straint, kt+1 = (∆ +A) kt − ct decreases. Thus, an increase of kt is followed by
a decrease of kt+1; eventually, two-period cycles arise.
The intuition for self-fulfilling prophecies under equilibrium indeterminacy is
the following. Assume that households anticipate an increase in the future price
pt+1, that is, in the inflation factor πt+1. We want to show that this expectation
can be self-fulfilling. Reconsider the Euler equation (5.1) with equality and the
cash-in-advance constraint (26), set γ = 0 and omit the individual index 0:
ct+1
ct
=
[
β (∆ + sA)
πt
πt+1
]σ
(36)
ct+1 = mt+1 (37)
where ∆+ sA is the gross real interest rate. From (36), we obtain the elasticity
of the inflation factor w.r.t. future consumption ct+1:
εpic ≡
dpit+1
dct+1
ct+1
pit+1
= − 1σ
We observe that an increase in the expected price pt+1 reduces the real balances
mt+1 ≡ Mt+1/pt+1 and, according to equation (37), the future consumption.
The decrease of ct+1 determines an increase of πt+1 according to (37). However,
such increase is required to be large enough in order to make the initial prophecy
of higher inflation self-fulfilling. This happens if and only if the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution σ in the left-hand side of (5.5) is sufficiently low, as
shown, among the others, by Cooley and Hansen (1989).
It is worth noting that these conclusions are similar the results of Ferraris
and Watanabe (2011) obtained in a monetary search model a` la Lagos and
Wright (2005) with credit constraint. They show indeed that when agents are
at their borrowing limits, fluctuations in capital occur through cycles of high
orders, chaos and sunspot equilibria.
5.6 A numerical illustration
Let us fix the parameters as follows according to yearly data: s = 2/3, A = 1,
∆ = 9/10, θ0 = 1/2, n0 = n1 = 1. Notice that s takes the usual value
of endogenous growth literature (see Mankiw et al. (1992)). In addition, for
now, we assume β0 = 0.98, β1 = 0.95, σ = 0.2 and we consider a plausible
money growth jointly with a moderate credit sensitivity to collaterals, namely
(η, γ) = (1.02, 0.01). It is worth noting at this point that choosing an elasticity
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of intertemporal substitution σ = 0.2 allows both to focus on a locally inde-
terminate BGP, since we get a bifurcation value σ∗ ≈ 0.24, and to consider a
plausible value for this parameter according to Campbell (1999), Kocherlakota
(1996) and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002).
According to this calibration, and as shown in Proposition 6, we find effects
of the money growth factor η on the welfare levels of the two classes, that are
the opposite to those obtained in the first regime where patient agents hold no
money:
∂U0
∂η
< 0 and ∂U1
∂η
> 0
The negative impact on patient agents comes from the negative effect of η on
their initial consumption c00. This happens because now patient agents bear an
opportunity cost to finance future consumption with money. This cost appears
to be larger than the benefit of additional money transfers from the monetary
authority. Conversely, impatient agents have a positive impact on their initial
consumption c10 as they bear a relatively lower opportunity cost of holding
money. It is worth noting however that the effect on the total welfare of the
economy is positive (i.e. n0∂U0/∂η+n1∂U1/∂η > 0). As mentioned previously,
considering that the more patient agents are richer as they hold the total stock
of capital, this result shows that a higher monetary growth rates allows at the
same time to increase total welfare and to decrease the inequality measured as
the lag between the stationary utility level of the two types of agents.
As shown by Proposition 6, the welfare impact of credit sensitivity to col-
laterals is given by
∂U0
∂γ > 0 and
∂U1
∂γ > 0
For both agents, increasing the credit sensitivity to collaterals allows to decrease
the amount of money holding and thus the associated opportunity cost. This
allows to increase consumption and thus welfare.
Let us now focus on Proposition 10 which clarifies the role of monetary policy
and regulation on the occurrence of local indeterminacy and growth cycles.
Indeed, η and γ have an impact on σ∗ and, thus, affect the indeterminacy
range (0, σ∗). Monetary policy (regulation) plays a stabilizing role if η (γ) has
a negative impact on σ∗, that is the room for indeterminacy and expectation-
driven fluctuations shrinks. Since the signs of derivatives ∂σ∗/∂η and ∂σ∗/∂γ
are in general ambiguous, to address the stabilization issue, we simulate in the
following the shape of the function σ∗ (η, γ).
Consider, for instance, a growth rate of 2%, that is g∗ = 1.02. We can
easily check that all the restrictions of the model are satisfied. We derive from
this calibration that the flip bifurcation value for the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution in consumption is σ∗ ≈ 0.282, again a plausible value according to
Campbell (1999), Kocherlakota (1996) and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002).
Focussing on the impact of η and γ on the existence of local indeterminacy,
we plot in Figure 5 the bifurcation value σ∗ as a function of η and γ around
(η, γ) = (1.02, 0.01).
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Figure 5: Monetary policy (η) and regulation (γ)
This numerical exercise shows that the indeterminacy range (0, σ∗) expands
with η and shrinks with γ as σ∗ is an increasing function with respect to η and a
decreasing function with respect to γ. Indeed, the higher the monetary growth
(η), the higher the inflation rate and the opportunity cost of holding money
(nominal interest rate), the heavier the burden on liquidity-constrained agents.
Thus, the larger the credit market imperfection, the more likely the occurrence
of endogenous fluctuations because of the local indeterminacy. Conversely the
sensitivity of credit grants to collaterals (γ) reduces the market imperfection,
because, when γ increases, collaterals matter more and the liquidity constraint
becomes lighter for patient agents.
We can then conclude from these numerical exercise that, if the goal of the
government is to avoid growth cycles, any increase of money supply should be
followed by an increase of the sensitivity of credit grants to collaterals. In the
light of the recent crisis, our results could be interpreted as a macroeconomic
policy device: since central banks are increasing the money supply through
quantitative easing policies, raising the weight of collaterals for all agents could
also appear as a mean to rule out destabilizing effects.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have considered a Ramsey model with heterogenous agents and
liquidity constraint. Heterogenous discount rates imply a social segmentation
in the long run: patient agents end up to hold the total stock of capital. Money
is needed to finance future consumption when the agents have an insufficient
amount of collaterals. In particular, impatient agents hold money.
In this economy, two regimes may arise according to the possibility that
patient agents hold balances or do not. We have studied the role of monetary
policy (η) and market regulation (γ) in both the cases.
(1) Patient agents buy on credit and money is needed only by workers.
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Money growth improves the patient agents’ welfare (they receive balances), but
worsens that of impatient agents, who bear the opportunity cost of holding
money (the higher inflation, the higher the interest rate). Since patient agents
are richer than impatient ones as they own the total amount of capital, this
conclusion can be interpreted as an increase of inequalities as the difference
between the utility level along the BGP of the two types of agents is increasing
with η. Moreover, the equilibrium jumps on the BGP from the initial condition
and there is no transitional dynamics.
(2) Patient agents needs money to consume. Monetary growth (η) is growth-
enhancing because under a higher inflation, patient agents renounce to balances,
consume less and accumulate more capital. The higher sensitivity of credit grant
to collaterals (γ) also promote economic growth, because patient agents accu-
mulate more capital to collateralize the consumption purchases and to reduce
money demand. However, in general, money growth and credit sensitivity to
collaterals have an ambiguous effect on the initial consumptions of patient and
impatient agents and the resulting effect on welfare remains ambiguous. We
have then shown using sufficient conditions on structural parameters and a nu-
merical simulation that an expansionary monetary policy can increase the total
welfare along the BGP but through a negative impact on the patient agents’
utility who now bear the opportunity cost of holding money. Patient agents are
still richer than impatient ones as they own the total amount of capital but this
conclusion can be interpreted as a decrease of inequalities measured as the lower
difference between the utility level along the BGP of the two types of agents.
On the contrary, increasing the credit sensitivity to collaterals improves welfare
for both agents.
Since in this second regime there is a transitional dynamics we have provided
conditions for local indeterminacy and growth cycles. Stabilization becomes an
important concern in the authority’s agenda and two policy instruments can be
used: the growth rate of money and the sensitivity of credit grants to collaterals.
We have shown that the indeterminacy range widens with η and shrinks with γ.
Indeed, a higher monetary growth raises the inflation rate and the opportunity
cost of money holding, making the burden of liquidity constraint heavier and
the credit market imperfection larger. Conversely the sensitivity of credit grants
to collaterals γ reduces the market imperfection: when γ increases, collaterals
matter more and the capitalists’ liquidity constraint weakens. If the goal of the
government is to avoid growth cycles, any increase of money supply should be
accompanied by an increase of the sensitivity of credit grants to collaterals.
7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Focus on the equilibrium budget constraints (10) and (20). Substituting k0t =
ktn1/n0 and (15) in (10), and (21) and (15) in (20) we obtain, respectively:
n1 [kt+1 − (∆ + r) kt] + n0c0t = n1θ0 (m1t+1πt+1 −m1t) (38)
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θ1m1t + (1− θ1)m1t+1πt+1 = wt (39)
Replacing (18) in (38) and (39) gives
n1 [kt+1 − (∆ + r) kt] + n0c0t = n1θ0 (η − 1)m1t (40)
[θ1 + (1− θ1) η]m1t = (1− s)Akt (41)
since wt = (1− s)Akt. Dividing (41) by kt, we obtain constant ratios:
(x0t, x1t) =
(
0, (1−s)A1+(η−1)θ0
)
Dividing (40) by kt, we get
c0t
kt
= n1n0
[
∆+ sA+ (1−s)A(η−1)θ01+(η−1)θ0 − gt+1
]
The patient agents’ Euler equation (4.1) becomes c0t+1/c0t = [β0 (∆ + sA)]
σ
.
The only possible equilibrium (compatible with the nonnegativity of quantities
and the transversality condition) is the BGP: kt = k0g
∗t and c0t = c00g
∗t with
g∗ = [β0 (∆ + sA)]
σ
. Under Assumption 6, we have g∗ ≥ 1. Moreover, the
transversality condition (11) becomes
lim
t→+∞
(
β0g
∗σ−1σ
)t
= 0
and holds under Assumption 6. There is no transition and the initial consump-
tion of the patient agent jumps on the BGP: (7.1) gives
c00 = k0
n1
n0
[
∆+ sA+ (1−s)A(η−1)θ01+(η−1)θ0 − g
∗
]
Under Assumption 6, we get c00 > 0.
The consumption of impatient agents along the BGP is given by c1t = c10g
∗t.
From (19) evaluated at time t = 0, we have
n1 (g
∗ −∆) + n0
c00
k0
+ n1
c10
k0
= n1A
and, using (7.1), we get:
c10 =
(1−s)Ak0
1+(η−1)θ0
7.2 Proof of Proposition 2
We compute the derivatives of the initial consumption levels given in Proposition
1 for both the agents:
∂c00
∂η = θ0
(1−s)Ak0
[1+(η−1)θ0]
2
n1
n0
> 0 and ∂c10∂η = −θ0
(1−s)Ak0
[1+(η−1)θ0]
2 < 0
Using the expression of welfare along the BGP (see (24)), we derive
∂Ui
∂η =
c
−1/σ
i0
1−βig∗1−1/σ
∂ci0
∂η
and the results follow. We finally observe that, if η > 1, then ∂c00/∂θ0 > 0 and
∂c10/∂θ0 < 0. Since, from (24), we have
∂Ui
∂θ0
=
c
−1/σ
i0
1−βig∗1−1/σ
∂ci0
∂θ0
the results follow.
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7.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Reconsider the equilibrium budget constraints. Replacing k0t = ktn1/n0, (15)
and (27) in (25), and (21), (15) and (27) in (20) we obtain, respectively:
[(1− θ0)n0m0t+1 − θ0n1m1t+1]πt+1 + θ0 (n0m0t + n1m1t)
= n1 [(∆ + r) kt − kt+1] + n0 (m0t − c0t) (42)
[(1− θ1)n1m1t+1 − θ1n0m0t+1]πt+1 + θ1 (n0m0t + n1m1t)
= n1wt (43)
In the second regime (capitalists hold money), the CIA constraint is binding:
c0t = m0t + γktn1/n0 (44)
and (42) reduces to
[(1− θ0)n0m0t+1 − θ0n1m1t+1]πt+1 + θ0 (n0m0t + n1m1t)
= n1 [(∆ + r − γ) kt − kt+1]
(45)
(18) becomes
n0m0t + n1m1t = (n0m0t+1 + n1m1t+1)πt+1/η (46)
Replacing (46) in (45) and (43), we get, respectively,[
n0m0t+1 +
1−η
η θ0 (n0m0t+1 + n1m1t+1)
]
πt+1
= n1 [(∆ + sA− γ) kt − kt+1][
n1m1t+1 +
1−η
η θ1 (n0m0t+1 + n1m1t+1)
]
πt+1
= n1 (1− s)Akt
Under Assumption 4 and constraint (44), patient agents’ Euler equation
(5.1) becomes
n0m0t+1+γn1kt+1
n0m0t+γn1kt
=
(
β0
pit
pit+1
∆+r−γ
1−γpit
)σ
Dividing (7.3), (7.3) and (7.3) by kt+1 and replacing (4.3), we obtain at time t:
[
n0x0t +
1− η
η
θ0 (n0x0t + n1x1t)
]
πt = n1
(
∆+ sA− γ
gt
− 1
)
(47)
[
n1x1t +
1− η
η
θ1 (n0x0t + n1x1t)
]
πt =
n1 (1− s)A
gt
(48)
n0x0t + γn1
n0x0t+1 + γn1
(
β0
πt
πt+1
∆+ sA− γ
1− γπt
)σ
= gt+1 (49)
Dividing (47) and (48) side by side, we get (3). From (46) and (7.3), we have
(28). Deriving πt from (48) and replacing πt and πt+1 in (49), we obtain (28).
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7.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Equation (28) becomes at the steady state:
ηn1x1 + (1− η) θ1 (n0x0 + n1x1) = n1 (1− s)A (50)
Replacing (50) in the Euler equation (28) evaluated at the steady state, gives
g = γη + β0 (∆ + sA− γ) g
σ−1
σ ≡ ϕ (g) (51)
an implicit equation which determines the balanced growth rate g∗. Replacing
(50) in (3) evaluated at the steady state, gives
ηn0x0 + (1− η) θ0 (n0x0 + n1x1) = n1 (∆ + sA− γ − g
∗) (52)
Equations (50) and (52) write as a linear system[
η + (1− η) θ0 (1− η) θ0
(1− η) θ1 η + (1− η) θ1
] [
n0x0
n1x1
]
= n1
[
∆+ sA− γ − g∗
(1− s)A
]
and can be solved with respect to (x0, x1). Noting that θ0 + θ1 = 1, we obtain
x0 =
(∆ + sA− γ − g∗) [1 + (η − 1) θ0] + (1− s)A(η − 1)θ0
η
n1
n0
(53)
x1 =
(1− s)A [1 + (η − 1) θ1] + θ1 (η − 1) (∆ + sA− γ − g
∗)
η
(54)
where g∗ is given by (51).
The asset ratio is given by m/k = n0x0 + n1x1 = n1 (A+∆− γ − g
∗). The
consumption of patient agents along the BGP is given by c0t = c00g
∗t and
the binding cash-in-advance along the BGP implies: c00 = (x0 + γn1/n0) k0.
Similarly, the consumption of impatient agents along the BGP is given by c1t =
c10g
∗t and the binding cash-in-advance along the BGP implies: c10 = m0 =
x1k0.
The existence of a balanced (monetary) equilibrium requires the positivity
of variables (and nominal interest rate) and the transversality condition to be
satisfied.
(1) Positivity of variables x0 and x1 needs, respectively:
g∗ < ∆+ sA− γ +
(1− s)A(η − 1)θ0
1 + (η − 1) θ0
≡ g1 (55)
g∗ < ∆+ sA− γ +
(1− s)A[1 + (η − 1)θ1]
(η − 1) θ1
≡ g2 (56)
Inequality (55) implies (56) as g2 > g1. Moreover, if g
∗ < g1, we get c00 > 0
and c10 > 0.
(2) We need to have a positive nominal interest rate to get a monetary
equilibrium, as money is required to be a dominated asset. We define the
nominal interest factor as it ≡ πt (∆ + sA) and we require the zero lower bound
for the interest rate: it − 1 > 0 (a productive economy exists if money is a
dominated asset). Since patient agents hold the stock of capital in the long run,
we need condition (5.1) to be satisfied with equality at the steady state, that is:
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g∗ =
(
β0
∆+sA−γ
1−γpi
)σ
Noting that i > 1 implies ∆ + sA > 1/π. We obtain from (7.4): g∗ ≥ (β0/π)
σ
.
Since, along the balanced growth path, (17) becomes η = πg∗, the inequality
which ensures a positive nominal interest rate writes
η > β0g
∗(σ−1)/σ (57)
(3) The Balanced Growth Transversality Condition (BGTC) requires
β0g
∗(σ−1)/σ < 1 (58)
Noting that g∗ = γη + (∆+ sA− γ)β0g
∗(σ−1)/σ, we get, more explicitly, g∗ <
∆ + sA + γ (η − 1) ≡ g3. Note that, when η = 1, we get g3 > g1. Moreover,
under Assumption 5, (58) implies (57).
To summarize, we conclude from all these claims that there exists η¯1 > 1
such that when η ∈ [1, η¯1), any BGP g
∗ < g1 satisfies the positivity constraints
of all the variables, the positivity of the nominal interest rate and the BGTC.
Let us prove now the existence and uniqueness of the BGP g∗ that is a
solution of equation (51), namely g∗ = ϕ (g∗). We are looking for a solution
such that g∗ ∈ [1, g1). We need to ensure that g1 > 1 or, equivalently,
∆ + sA− γ + (1−s)A(η−1)θ01+(η−1)θ0 > 1
Under Assumption 7.1, this inequality holds.
Consider first the simplest case σ = 1 yielding g∗ = γη + (∆ + sA− γ)β0.
Under Assumption 8 we get g∗ ≥ 1. Under Assumption 9 with σ = 1, inequality
g∗ < g1 holds for η = 1. Then, there exists η¯2 > 1 such that, when η ∈ [1, η¯2),
g∗ = γη + (∆+ sA− γ)β0 < g1.
Let us now consider the case σ < 1. We get, ϕ′ (g) < 0 for every g > 0.
Moreover, we have limg→0+ ϕ (g) = +∞ and limg→+∞ ϕ (g) = γη. Graphically
we get the following figure.
ϕ(g)
g0 g∗ g1
γη
1
ϕ(1)
Figure 6: Existence and uniqueness of g∗ ∈ (1, g1) when σ < 1.
We immediately obtain the existence and the uniqueness of a solution g∗ of
equation (51). Moreover, under Assumption 8, we get g∗ ≥ 1 while Assumption
9 implies ϕ (g1) < g1 and thus g
∗ < g1 when η = 1. Then there exists η¯3 > 1
such that when η ∈ [1, η¯3), g
∗ < g1.
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Let us finally consider the case σ > 1. We get, ϕ′ (g) > 0, ϕ′′ (g) < 0 for
every g > 0. Moreover, we have limg→0+ ϕ (g) = γη > 0, limg→+∞ ϕ (g) = +∞
and limg→+∞ ϕ
′ (g) = 0 < 1. Graphically we get the following figure.
ϕ(g)
g
0
g∗ g1
γη
1
ϕ(1)
Figure 7: Existence and uniqueness of g∗ ∈ (1, g1) when σ > 1.
The existence and the uniqueness of a solution g∗ of equation (51) follow.
Moreover, under Assumption 8 we get g∗ ≥ 1 while Assumption 9 implies
ϕ (g1) < g1 and thus g
∗ < g1 when η = 1. Then there exists η¯4 > 1 such
that when η ∈ [1, η¯4), g
∗ < g1.
Taking η¯ ≡ min {η¯1, η¯2, η¯3, η¯4}, we obtain the results.
7.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Focus first on (29). Totally differentiating with respect to γ, η, g and noting
that
β0g
∗1−1/σ = g
∗−γη
∆+sA−γ
we get
g∗ pi(∆+sA)−1∆+sA−γ dγ + γdη +
γpi(1−σ)−1
σ dg
∗ = 0
Setting dγ = 0 in (7.5), we get the partial derivative (5): the impact of
monetary policy on the growth rate is always positive.
Setting dη = 0 in (7.5), we obtain (5). The impact of regulation is positive
(∂g∗/∂γ > 0) because the nominal interest rate is positive: π (∆ + sA) > 1.
7.6 Proof of Proposition 6
Consider the expression (24). The effect of η on U0 is given by
∂U0
∂η =
c
1−1/σ
00
1−β0g∗1−1/σ
[
1
g∗
∂g∗
∂η
β0g
∗1−1/σ
1−β0g∗1−1/σ
+ 1c00
∂c00
∂η
]
The trade-off between the initial consumption and the growth rate is a usual
feature of the endogenous growth models. The utility of patient agents increases
because of the positive impact on the growth rate:
1
g∗
∂g∗
∂η
β0g
∗1−1/σ
1−β0g∗1−1/σ
> 0
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(see the inequality (5) and the transversality condition: 1 − β0g
∗1−1/σ > 0)
and may decrease because of the ambiguous effect on the initial consumption.
Indeed, using (32), we get
∂c00
∂η = k0
n1
n0
[
(1−s)Aθ0−θ1(∆+sA−g
∗−γ)
η2 −
1+(η−1)θ0
η
∂g∗
∂η
]
(59)
which can be positive or negative.
Consider the term between brackets in equation (7.6). Note from Proposition
5 that if γ is close enough to zero, the derivative ∂g∗/∂η is also close to zero
and ∂U0/∂η has the same sign as ∂c00/∂η. Consider now the term between
brackets in equation (59). If θ0 is also close enough to zero, then ∂c00/∂η < 0
so that ∂U0/∂η < 0. Therefore, there exist γˆ > 0 and θˆ0 ∈ (0, 1) such that,
when γ ∈ (0, γˆ) and θ0 ∈ (0, θˆ0), then ∂U0/∂η < 0.
The impact of γ on U0 is given by
∂U0
∂γ =
c
1−1/σ
00
1−β0g∗1−1/σ
[
1
g∗
∂g∗
∂γ
β0g
∗1−1/σ
1−β0g∗1−1/σ
+ 1c00
∂c00
∂γ
]
There exists a trade-off between the initial consumption and the growth
rate. The utility of patient agents increases because of the positive impact on
the growth rate:
1
g∗
∂g∗
∂γ
β0g
∗1−1/σ
1−β0g∗1−1/σ
> 0
and can decrease because of the ambiguous effect on the initial consumption.
Indeed, using (32), we get
∂c00
∂γ = k0
n1
n0
[
η−1
η θ1 −
∂g∗
∂γ
1+(η−1)θ0
η
]
(60)
which may be positive or negative.
Consider the term between brackets in equation (7.6). From equations (30)
and (32) in Proposition 4 we derive
c00 = k0
n1
n0
(η−1)[γθ1+(1−s)Aθ0]+(∆+sA−g
∗)[1+(η−1)θ0]
η
Substituting this expression into (60) gives
1
c00
∂c00
∂γ =
(η−1)θ1−
∂g∗
∂γ [1+(η−1)θ0]
(η−1)[γθ1+(1−s)Aθ0]+(∆+sA−g∗)[1+(η−1)θ0]
(61)
Substituting (61) into (7.6) then yields after simplifications
∂U0
∂γ =
c
1−1/σ
00
1−β0g∗1−1/σ
[
(η−1)θ1
(η−1)[γθ1+(1−s)Aθ0]+[1+(η−1)θ0][∆+sA−g∗]
+ ∂g
∗
∂γ
β0g
∗1−1/σ[(η−1)[γθ1+(1−s)Aθ0]+[1+(η−1)θ0](∆+sA)]−g
∗[1+(η−1)θ0]
g∗[1−β0g∗1−1/σ]{(η−1)[γθ1+(1−s)Aθ0]+[1+(η−1)θ0][∆+sA−g∗]}
]
Consider then equation (29) that can be written as
β0g
∗1−1/σ(∆ + sA) = g∗ − γ
[
η − β0g
∗1−1/σ
]
Substituting this expression into (7.6) finally gives
∂U0
∂γ =
c
1−1/σ
00
1−β0g∗1−1/σ
[
(η−1)θ1
(η−1)[γθ1+(1−s)Aθ0]+[1+(η−1)θ0][∆+sA−g∗]
+ ∂g
∗
∂γ
β0g
∗1−1/σ(η−1)[γθ1+(1−s)Aθ0]−γ[1+(η−1)θ0][η−β0g∗1−1/σ]
g∗[1−β0g∗1−1/σ]{(η−1)[γθ1+(1−s)Aθ0]+[1+(η−1)θ0][∆+sA−g∗]}
]
Therefore, there exists γ˜ > 0 such that when γ ∈ (0, γ˜), then ∂U0/∂γ > 0.
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Focus now on the welfare of impatient agents. The impact of η on U1 is
given by
∂U1
∂η =
c
1−1/σ
10
1−β1g∗1−1/σ
[
1
g∗
∂g∗
∂η
β1g
∗1−1/σ
1−β1g∗1−1/σ
+ 1c10
∂c10
∂η
]
As for agents of type 0, there exists a trade-off between the initial consump-
tion and the growth rate. The utility of impatient agents increases because of
the positive impact on the growth rate:
1
g∗
∂g∗
∂η
β1g
∗1−1/σ
1−β1g∗1−1/σ
> 0
(inequality (5) and transversality condition: 1 − β1g
∗1−1/σ > 0) and may de-
crease because of the ambiguous effect on the initial consumption. Indeed, using
(33) and (59), we get ∂c10
∂η = −k0
∂g∗
∂η −
n0
n1
∂c00
∂η (62)
which can be positive or negative.
Consider the term between brackets in equation (7.6). Recall that if γ is
close enough to zero, the derivative ∂g∗/∂η is also close to zero and ∂U1/∂η
has the same sign as ∂c10/∂η. Consider then equation (62). If ∂g
∗/∂η is close
to zero, ∂c00/∂η and ∂c10/∂η work in opposite directions. Therefore, there
exist γ¯ ∈ (0, γˆ] and θ¯0 ∈ (0, θˆ0] such that, if γ ∈ (0, γ¯) and θ0 ∈
(
0, θ¯0
)
, then
∂U1/∂η > 0.
Focus finally on ∂U1/∂γ. We have
∂U1
∂γ =
c
1−1/σ
10
1−β1g∗1−1/σ
[
1
g∗
∂g∗
∂γ
β1g
∗1−1/σ
1−β1g∗1−1/σ
+ 1c10
∂c10
∂γ
]
There exists a trade-off between the initial consumption and the growth rate.
The utility of impatient agents increases because of the positive impact on the
growth rate:
1
g∗
∂g∗
∂γ
β1g
∗1−1/σ
1−β1g∗1−1/σ
> 0
and can decrease because of the ambiguous effect on the initial consumption.
Indeed, using (33), we find
∂c10
∂γ = −θ1
η−1
η
(
1 + ∂g
∗
∂γ
)
k0 < 0 (63)
Consider the term between brackets in equation (7.6). From equations (31)
and (33) in Proposition 4 we derive
c10 = k0
(1−s)A[1+(η−1)θ1]+θ1(η−1)(∆+sA−γ−g
∗)
η
Substituting this expression into (63) gives
1
c10
∂c10
∂γ = −
θ1(η−1)
(
1+ ∂g
∗
∂γ
)
(1−s)A[1+(η−1)θ1]+θ1(η−1)(∆+sA−γ−g∗)
(64)
Substituting (64) into (7.6) then yields after simplifications
∂U1
∂γ =
c
1−1/σ
10
1−β1g∗1−1/σ
[
−(η−1)θ1
(1−s)A[1+(η−1)θ1]+(η−1)θ1[∆+sA−γ−g∗]
+ ∂g
∗
∂γ
β1g
∗1−1/σ{(1−s)A[1+(η−1)θ1]+(η−1)θ1[∆+sA−γ]}−g
∗(η−1)θ1
g∗[1−β1g∗1−1/σ]{(1−s)A[1+(η−1)θ1]+(η−1)θ1[∆+sA−γ−g∗]}
]
Therefore, there exists θ˜1 ∈ (0, 1) such that when θ1 ∈ (0, θ˜1), then ∂U1/∂γ > 0.
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7.7 Proof of Lemma 7
Equation (50) reduces to
η (1− z0) + (1− η) θ1 =
n1(1−s)A
n0x0+n1x1
Linearizing equation (28) and using (7.7), we obtain
(z0 − a0)
dx0t+1
x0
− (z0 − a0)
dx1t+1
x1
= z0
dx0t
x0
+ (1− z0)
dx1t
x1
In order to linearize the second equation, we apply the elasticities (5.5). Under
equation (50), equation (28), evaluated at the steady state, writes:
1− γη/g∗ = β0 (sA+∆− γ) g
∗−1/σ (65)
After some computations, we obtain using equations (7.7) and (65):(
a0 + ε0 −
y0+ε0
σ
) dx0t+1
x0
+
(
1− a0 + ε1 −
ε1
σ
) dx1t+1
x1
=
[
h (a0 + ε0)−
y0
σ
]
dx0t
x0
+ h (1− a0 + ε1)
dx1t
x1
where h is given by (34).
System (7.7)-(7.7) is represented by the following Jacobian matrix:
J =
[
z0 − a0 a0 − z0
a0 +
σ−1
σ ε0 −
y0
σ 1− a0 +
σ−1
σ ε1
]−1
[
z0 1− z0
h (a0 + ε0)−
y0
σ h (1− a0 + ε1)
] (66)
Straightforward computations yield the expression of J as given by (35). From
(3), noticing that
g∗ = ∆+ sA− γ − (1− s)Aηn0x0+(1−η)θ0(n0x0+n1x1)ηn1x1+(1−η)θ1(n0x0+n1x1)
and using θ0 + θ1 = 1 and (50), we compute the elasticities ε0 and ε1:
ε1 = −ε0 =
x1
g∗
ηz0
η(1−z0)+(1−η)θ1
Replacing (7.7) in (66), we get (35). We then easily derive the determinant and
the trace:
D = y0(1−z0)+hσ(z0−a0−ε0)(σ−y0)(z0−a0) and T = 1 +D +
1+(h−1)σ
(σ−y0)(z0−a0)
ε0
Note finally that from (30)-(31) we get
n0x0 + n1x1 = n1 (∆ +A− γ − g
∗)
It follows from (7.7) that
η (1− z0) + (1− η) θ1 =
(1−s)A
∆+A−γ−g∗ > 0
and thus ε1 = −ε0 > 0 for any η > 1.
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7.8 Proof of Lemma 8
We have proved that ε0 < 0 for any η > 1. Moreover, we know that h > 1.
Finally it is easy to derive that z0 − a0 > 0. We conclude that for any σ ≥ 0
1+(h−1)σ
(σ−y0)(z0−a0)
ε0 6= 0
so that T 6= 1 + D and any bifurcation with an eigenvalue equal to 1 is ruled
out. Moreover, when β0 = β
∗
0 with β
∗
0 as given by (5.5), we get g
∗ = 1 and from
the expressions of D and T , we derive that, when σ = σ¯ ≡ y0, then D = ±∞
and T = ±∞. By continuity, there exists ǫ > 0 such that for any g∗ ∈ [1, 1 + ǫ),
the result holds.
7.9 Proof of Lemma 9
Fix now the steady state g∗ by scaling the parameter β0 according to (5.5). The
origin of the line Σ is given by
D0 =
1−z0
a0−z0
= 1− θ1+(1−θ1)ηηz0 < 0
T0 = 1 +D0 +
ε0
y0(a0−z0)
= 1 +D0 +
x1
y0(1−z0)
Then, D0 < T0−1. Note now that D0 is an increasing function of η. Therefore,
if D0 > −1 when η = 1, then D0 > −1 for any η > 1. Thus, using (5.5), (53)
and (54) with g∗ = η = 1, we get D0 > −1 under Assumption 7.2. The endpoint
is given by
D∞ ≡ limσ→+∞D (σ) = h
z0−a0−ε0
z0−a0
= h
(
1 + ε0a0−z0
)
= h
(
1 + x11−z0
)
> 1
T∞ ≡ limσ→+∞ T (σ) = 1 +D +
1+(h−1)σ
(σ−y0)(z0−a0)
ε0 = 1 + h+
ε0
a0−z0
= 1 + h+ x1z1 = 1 +D∞ − (h− 1)
x1
1−z0
> 2
Then, D∞ > 1, T∞ > 2 and D∞ > T∞ − 1. The slope of Σ is given by
S = D
′(σ)
T ′(σ) =
−[h(z0−a0−ε0)+(1−z0)]y0
−([h(z0−a0−ε0)+(1−z0)]y0+[(h−1)y0+1]ε0)
=
[
1 +
1
y0
+h−1
1−z0
ε0
−h
(
1+
a0−z0
ε0
)
]−1
=
[
1 +
1
y0
+h−1
1−z0
ε0
−h
(
1+
1−z0
x1
)
]−1
and does not depend directly on σ. We know that ε0 < 0 and h > 1: thus S < 0
or S > 1. We finally notice that
D′ (σ) = ε0a0−z0
y0
(σ−y0)
2
[
1−z0
ε0
− h
(
1 + a0−z0ε0
)]
= x1y0
g(1−z0)(σ−y0)
2
[
1−z0
ε0
− h
(
1 + 1−z0x1
)]
= S1−S
x1
1−z0
1+(h−1)y0
(σ−y0)
2
We conclude that D′ (σ) < 0.
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